

The Systemic Impact of Monitoring and Evaluation on the Performance of Development Projects or Programs in Burkina Faso

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Abstract. This article analyzes the systemic impact of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework on the operational and strategic performance of development projects or programs (DPPs) in Burkina Faso, within a context shaped by Results-Based Management (RBM), security instability, and rural logistical barriers. Utilizing a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design, a 35-item questionnaire was administered to 45 key actors across the project management chain, complemented by in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted to theoretical saturation with project directors, local beneficiaries, and independent evaluators. Data were processed using SPSS v26 for inferential statistical analysis (Spearman's Rho, ANOVA, and Chi-square) alongside matrix thematic content analysis. Results confirm that while system formalization positively influences primary data quality ($\rho = 0.624$, $p = 0.002$), severe logistical constraints (68.9%) and lack of continuous technical training (57.8%) exponentially delay corrective actions ($F(3, 41) = 14.82$, $p = 0.0001$), extending decision-making times from 5 days in central units to over 38 days in remote, security-compromised branches. Furthermore, the heavy report orientation toward donor accountability (82.2%) significantly inhibits internal organizational learning ($\chi^2 = 18.45$, $p = 0.001$). The study conceptualizes this pattern as the "Facade Compliance Syndrome," wherein management units maintain formal administrative rituals to secure external funding while masking field operational dysfunctions, ultimately hindering SDG 16.6 and SDG 1 targets. To restore strategic utility, four core reforms are proposed: offline mobile digitalization, a 50% reduction in indicator matrices focused on 10 core KPIs, decentralized local decision cells with budget powers, and continuous certified technical capacity building.

Keywords: Monitoring-Evaluation; Performance; Results-Based Management; Development Projects.

1. General Introduction & Problem Statement

1.1 Context of the Study

In Sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly in developing countries like Burkina Faso, the implementation of public policies aimed at poverty reduction relies heavily on development projects or programs (DPPs). Faced with increased demands for transparency, efficiency, and accountability formulated both by technical and financial partners (TFPs) and beneficiary populations, Results-Based Management (RBM) has established itself as the dominant managerial paradigm. In this architecture, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system must no longer be perceived as a mere administrative formality or an ex-post control exercise, but rather as the core of the strategic steering of public action.

National development projects or programs, placed under the oversight of the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Burkina Faso, embody this ambition. Operating on a national scale to boost promising sectors, finance income-generating activities (IGAs), and build basic socio-economic infrastructures, these entities handle complex and multidimensional data flows. To orchestrate these interventions, these initiatives have adopted a manual and a formal M&E framework. This regulatory framework aligns with national guidelines for steering public policies (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2023; MEFP, 2019). However, empirical literature shows that the simple existence of M&E tools does not automatically guarantee an improvement in project performance.

1.2. Expansion of the Territorial Context: The Challenges of Contemporary Rural Burkina Faso

To understand the systemic impact of M&E, it is necessary to delve into the territorial and sociopolitical reality of contemporary Burkina Faso. The rural Burkinabè environment is undergoing profound administrative and structural mutations, characterized by an incomplete decentralization process and a weakening of local authorities. Rural communes, which are the primary arenas for the implementation of DPPs, face unprecedented multidimensional crises. The expansion of insecurity and humanitarian crises abruptly redefines the country's administrative geography, isolating certain parts of the territory. Local initiatives must then design agile mechanisms adapted to conflict zones (Solidar Suisse & Partners, 2022).

This security instability exerts a direct constraint on the collection of primary data. M&E officers and field animators can no longer access certain project zones freely, which induces a rupture in the continuity of information flows. Permanent administrative mutations, coupled with massive population displacements, render baseline databases obsolete. The collection of raw information in rural areas is no longer a simple technical routine, but a high-risk operation subject to representativeness biases, loss of physical documents, and the impossibility of conducting direct field surveys or focus groups serenely. This information disruption heavily weakens social accountability at the local level (Ground Truth Solutions, 2021). Notably, the deployment drew inspiration from evaluation

protocols in constrained environments (Bamberger et al., 2012) and sector manuals in force (SP-CPSA, 2020).

1.3. Strategic Alignment: M&E and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

In this context, the systemic strengthening of M&E is not limited to a simple technical adjustment of project management, and it is essential for international development programs. There is an essential and official link between the strengthening of state systems and infrastructures (M&E) and the establishment of transparent, accountable, and effective institutions, as required by Target 16.6 of the UN's Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16). An effective monitoring and evaluation system does not just produce data for isolated databases; it promotes public transparency and the obligation to render accounts, which build the trust of citizens and partners toward the government.

In turn, anchoring solid and transparent institutions (SDG 16) constitutes the indispensable foundation upon which poverty eradication programs (SDG 1) rest. Without rigorous monitoring mechanisms, investments intended for vulnerable populations, food security, and basic infrastructure risk being diluted by operational inefficiencies and invisible losses. Optimizing M&E in Burkina Faso amounts to building the State's capacity to steer social resilience, guarantee the distributive equity of public resources, and measure the real impact of interventions on monetary and multidimensional poverty indicators.

1.4. Problem Statement and Research Questions

Critical analysis of project management systems reveals a recurring gap between the theoretical design of M&E frameworks and their actual use on the ground. In Burkina Faso, logistical dysfunctions, security context instability, and local capacity weaknesses often transform M&E into a bureaucratic tool for accountability, disconnected from the decision-making needs of local actors. Hence, the central question of this research arises: How and to what extent does the monitoring and evaluation system of development projects or programs contribute to the global and operational performance of these structures?

From this fundamental question flow three specific questions:

1. How is the M&E framework of these development projects or programs structured and perceived by its actors?
2. What are the technical and organizational bottlenecks that hinder its effective implementation?
3. What is the real influence of data derived from M&E on corrective decision-making and collective learning?

1.5. Research Hypotheses

To guide our empirical investigation, we formulate three working hypotheses:

- H₁: The clear formalization and standardization of M&E tools positively influence the quality of primary data collection.

- H₂: Logistical constraints and the deficit of continuous training for agents reduce the effectiveness of feedback loops and corrective actions.
- H₃: The exclusive orientation of M&E toward external accountability (donors) inhibits its use as an instrument for organizational learning and managerial adaptation.

2. Theoretical Framework & Literature Review

2.1. Theoretical Anchorings of Monitoring-Evaluation

2.1.1 Development of the Kusek and Rist Model (2004) and its Burkinabè Confrontation

The ten-step model of Kusek and Rist (2004), formalized under the auspices of the World Bank, proposes a sequential roadmap for designing and operating a results-based M&E system. Rather than treating it as a universal abstraction, it is appropriate to detail five of its key steps by confronting them directly with the realities of the public administration of Burkina Faso.

1. Assessing Institutional Capacity (Step 2): This phase requires evaluating the organization's degree of maturity regarding M&E (human, technological, budgetary resources, and political culture). When confronted with the Burkinabè administration, this step highlights a considerable gap. Sectoral departments and management entities suffer from a severe shortage of permanent M&E experts. Positions are often occupied by agents without advanced statistical expertise, and budgets allocated to monitoring and evaluation are primarily subject to budget cuts during crisis adjustments.
2. Choosing Key Performance Indicators (Step 4): Kusek and Rist advocate for formulating clear, measurable, and realistic indicators. The Burkinabè administrative reality is quite different: under pressure from the standardized logical frameworks of donors, projects inherit matrices containing dozens of ultra-complex composite indicators. These indicators require heavy calculations or surveys that local structures have neither the time nor the resources to execute, leading to approximations.
3. Establishing Baselines (Step 5): It is essential to define the reference situation (baseline) to evaluate subsequent progress. In Burkina Faso, the completion of this baseline is frequently neglected or delayed due to the inaccessibility of local statistical data (National Institute of Statistics and Demography - INSD) or difficulties in reaching rural areas to conduct baseline surveys. Projects are therefore started without solid initial references, which completely distorts the evaluation of their future impacts.
4. Selecting Performance Targets (Step 6): Setting realistic targets assumes visibility over macroeconomic and security evolutions. However, in Sahelian contexts, security hazards wipe out forecasts. The administration finds itself constrained to accept overly ambitious targets set by the international

headquarters of TFPs to validate financing, immediately disconnecting theoretical planning from actual execution capacity.

5. The Role of Performance Reports (Step 8): According to the model, reports must be transmitted to decision-makers to adjust public action. In local practice, performance reports are perceived as control and accounting audit tools. They are written in a technical jargon specific to donor requirements or sleep in drawers and are never the subject of a constructive restitution to the rural communities or field teams who nevertheless supplied them.

2.1.2. Deepening Patton's Theory (2008): Utilization-Focused Evaluation Faced with Power Tensions

The theory of Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE) developed by Michael Quinn Patton (2008) postulates that the ultimate relevance of an evaluative process is assessed by the measure of its active appropriation by its real users. Patton shifts the focus from pure formal methodological validity to pragmatic utility for decision-making. A report that is perfect on an academic level but ends its journey in a ministerial drawer represents an absolute failure according to this theoretical framework. UFE requires identifying key users from the start and co-constructing the evaluative design with them to guarantee organizational learning.

This theoretical posture reveals a sharp conceptual and political tension in developing countries like Burkina Faso. A systemic clash is observed between:

- Democratic and participatory evaluation, which advocates for a horizontal approach, values local knowledge, listens to the perceptions of beneficiaries, and privileges flexible managerial adaptation on the ground. This approach aligns with the principles of fourth-generation evaluation, which privileges constructivism and negotiation among actors (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).
- Top-down technocratic evaluation, dictated by the normative requirements of donors. The latter, of a positivist and managerial nature, imposes closed logical frameworks, quantitative compliance audits, and standardized indicators carved into rigid financial disbursement windows.

This tension transforms M&E into an instrument for exercising power. Burkinabè project managers find themselves caught in a vice: if they invest in listening to local needs (Patton), they risk deviating from the strict contractual indicators set by TFPs, exposing themselves to suspensions of disbursements. To survive administratively, they sacrifice utilization-focused evaluation in favor of a technocratic formality-evaluation, disabling the reflexive function of their framework.

2.1.3. The Systemic Approach to Project Performance

Performance cannot be reduced to compliance with the golden triangle of “Cost-Time-Quality” (Kerzner, 2013). It integrates stakeholder satisfaction, sustainable value creation, and the reinforcement of the territorial resilience of beneficiaries. Success then depends on the institutionalization of these practices within the organizational culture (Stockmann & Meyer, 2016).

2.2. Trajectory of Results-Based Management (RBM): From New Public Management to the Sahel

To understand the ubiquity of current M&E, it is necessary to retrace the genealogy of Results-Based Management (RBM). RBM is founded on the principles of New Public Management (NPM), a reformist trend that emerged in Anglo-Saxon countries during the 1970s and 1980s. NPM aimed to promote efficient and economically lean logics within the administration, inspired by the private sector, thereby putting an end to the classic Weberian bureaucracy centered on compliance with procedures rather than results.

In the 1990s and 2000s, stimulated by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), RBM was institutionalized by Bretton Woods institutions and considered an essential criterion for aid. It was thus imposed on the administrations of Sahelian countries, and specifically in Burkina Faso, through Structural Adjustment Programs, then Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and the National Plan for Economic and Social Development (PNDES), which has now become a recovery plan. This dynamic is part of a sub-regional effort to harmonize steering tools (WAEMU, 2021) and strengthen resilience capacities (UNDP, 2016).

This trajectory highlights a form of institutional imitation. RBM, designed for stable and highly digitalized Western institutions endowed with sustainable human resources, was imposed on Sahelian entities marked by institutional instability, a culture of orality, and unstable structures. In the Sahel, the implementation of RBM gave rise to increased bureaucratization: rather than streamlining public management, it generated additional complexity (huge procedural manuals, performance evaluations multiplying the volume of work), converting the NPM ideal of efficiency into a new form of bureaucracy focused on indicators. This phenomenon reflects an institutional mimicry where imported reforms struggle to take root in the Burkinabè administration (Zeba & Sossa, 2025).

2.3. Broadening the Debate of the Empirical Review: Linear Approaches vs. Critical Theories

Empirical literature highlights a conceptual divide regarding the purposes of M&E in development projects in Africa. On one hand, institutional works (Donors, World Bank, OECD) defend a direct linear relationship between the rigor of the M&E framework and the success of interventions. According to Bours et al. (2014), a highly structured system allows for a 40% reduction in cost overruns thanks to early detection of budgetary deviations. The application of revised evaluation criteria aims precisely to standardize this effectiveness (OECD-DAC, 2020). This positivist vision emphasizes the institutionalization of processes and the standardization of quantitative performance indicators, and considers that the production of reliable statistical gaps mechanically leads to rational corrective decisions by managers.

On the other hand, researchers subscribing to development economics and critical theories of post-development (Chapman & Mancini, 2010; Rogers, 2014) adopt a much more critical posture, particularly in contexts of institutional fragility or Sahelian urgency. The limitations of linear models are particularly visible when evaluating public policies for adaptation to environmental crises (Diallo, 2021). They emphasize that the importation of rigid Western results frameworks proves totally unsuited to the fluid, non-linear, and unpredictable dynamics of the African terrain.

Post-development theorists denounce the excesses of the "indicator overload". By seeking to measure, quantify, and control everything, organizations generate paralysis by analysis. The excess of complex indicators creates a disproportionate administrative burden for local teams. To satisfy the contractual requirements of donors, these teams find themselves forced to divert their energy from the actual deployment of the project toward the bureaucratic manipulation of data. We then witness a "fabrication of data" or a statistical smoothing to tick the boxes of performance reports, thereby destroying all potential for organizational learning, authenticity, and system flexibility. M&E becomes a ritual of quantitative self-satisfaction for technocratic elites, increasingly disconnected from the well-being and voice of marginalized communities. Many sectors, such as basic education, thus suffer from a deficit of real learning despite the multiplication of diagnostics (Agbodjan et al, 2023).

3. Research Methodology

3.1. Research Design

To grasp the complexity of the M&E framework within these structures, we opted for a sequential explanatory mixed research design. This approach allows for the triangulation of macroscopic quantitative data with microscopic qualitative data to give meaning to statistical indicators.

3.2. Study Population and Sampling

The study population consists of key actors involved in the information management chain of development projects or programs in Burkina Faso. Sampling was done using a purposive probabilistic approach for the quantitative component and a saturated theoretical choice for the qualitative component.

- Quantitative Sample: Composed of 12 monitoring-evaluation officers, 15 technical component heads, 10 focal points from partner ministries, and 8 expert consultants from the accompanying firm.
- Qualitative Sample: In-depth interviews conducted up to theoretical saturation with 4 project directors, 3 representatives of beneficiaries at the communal level, 3 officers from the Project Management Unit (PMU), and 2 independent external evaluators.

3.3. Data Collection Tools and Analysis Techniques

Primary data collection took place over a period spanning from August to November 2025. A 35-item questionnaire (5-point Likert scales, closed questions, and multiple choice) was distributed online and in the field. In parallel, a semi-structured interview guide was used to explore the perceptions of actors.

Quantitative data were cleaned, coded, and processed using SPSS v26 software. Beyond descriptive statistics, care was taken to implement non-parametric correlation tests (Spearman's Rho) and analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test our hypotheses. Qualitative data underwent full transcription and a matrix thematic categorical content analysis.

4. Presentation of Results & Statistical Analysis

4.1. Sample Characteristics and System Formalization

Descriptive analysis of the profiles indicates that 78% of respondents possess an education level greater than or equal to a Master's degree, ensuring a good understanding of results-based management concepts.

Regarding the structuring of the system, the results confirm a strong theoretical formalization: 88.9% of actors assert the existence of a formal M&E plan and 93.3% validate the presence of a clear and shared logical framework. However, the operational clarity of indicators shows major flaws, as nearly 44% of field actors perceive the program's indicators as ambiguous or unusable for daily steering, casting doubt on the effectiveness of collection.

4.2 Empirical Validation of Research Hypotheses

4.2.1. Test of Hypothesis H₁: Formalization vs. Data Quality

To verify whether the clear formalization of the system improves collection quality, we crossed the variable "Existence of a standardized M&E plan" with the variable "Reliability and completeness of collected data" via the calculation of Spearman's Rho correlation coefficient.

The statistical calculation provides the following results:

- Correlation coefficient: $\rho = 0.624$
- Value of $p = 0.002$ ($p < 0.01$)

Since the p-value is well below the 1% significance threshold, the correlation is statistically, financially, and managerially highly significant. Hypothesis H₁ is validated. The formal structuring of the system constitutes indeed an indispensable prerequisite to ground the quality of raw information.

4.2.2. Test of Hypothesis H₂: Logistical and Competence Constraints vs. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions (Explication of the ANOVA)

The evaluation of operational capacities shows that 68.9% of respondents judge material and logistical resources (vehicles for field missions, computers, internet connections) as insufficient or totally critical. Furthermore, 57.8% point out the absence of continuous training on data analysis software (such as SPSS or KOBO Toolbox).

To measure the impact of these deficiencies on the program's reactivity, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was executed. It compares the level of logistical insufficiency to the average time (in days) required to implement a validated corrective action after an anomaly is detected.

Statistical and Mathematical Interpretation of the ANOVA:

The statistic $F(3, 41) = 14.82$ is highly significant ($p = 0.0001 < 0.05$). There is a major statistical difference between the groups. The more severe the logistical and training deficiencies, the more the implementation time for corrections lengthens exponentially.

To clarify the variables underlying this model, it is necessary to analyze the reality experienced by isolated regional branches (for example, in the Sahel, East, or Boucle du Mouhoun regions). Quantitative data indicate that average correction times rise from 5 days in well-equipped central West African structures to more than 38 days in these remote peripheral branches. This drastic jump of 33 days is explained by three critical variables:

1. The global physical infrastructure: Rural tracks that are impassable during the rainy season slow down the transport of collection forms or verification teams.
2. Faulty digital connectivity: Regular blackouts of the electricity grid and the weakness of the internet telecommunication network prevent real-time synchronization of local databases with the PMU's central server.
3. The multidimensional security crisis: The presence of high-security challenge zones forces the temporary suspension of supervision missions or requires complex military escorts to plan, considerably lengthening administrative action time.

Hypothesis H₂ is thus validated.

4.2.3. Test of Hypothesis H₃: External Accountability vs. Organizational Learning

The questionnaire explored the main destinations of the performance reports generated by the M&E service. The descriptive results are unequivocal (Table 1):

**Table 1. Primary Destination and Utilization of Performance Reports
Generated by the M&E**

Destination of M&E Report Utilization	Percentage
Donor / TFP Accountability	82%
Internal Hierarchical Control	51%
Planning and Adjustment	22%
Community Learning	4%

To test the influence of this orientation on performance, a Chi-Squared test of independence was applied to analyze the relationship between the primary use of M&E (Accountability vs. Learning) and the level of actual attainment of the project's global objectives.

- Calculated Chi-Squared (χ^2) value: 18.45
- Degree of freedom (df): 4
- Critical χ^2 at 5%: 9.49
- p -value = 0.001

Since the calculated $\chi^2 >$ critical χ^2 , we reject the null hypothesis of independence. There is a strong link between the political orientation of M&E and the actual effectiveness of the project. The exclusive orientation toward external accountability severely harms local performance by depriving field teams of actionable learning data on a day-to-day basis. Hypothesis H₃ is validated.

4.3. Integration of Qualitative Analysis: Mixed Triangulation and Verbatims

To deepen the raw statistical analyses, the implementation of a mixed triangulation is indispensable. The in-depth interviews conducted with the key actors of the qualitative sample illustrate the human and organizational reality hidden behind the ANOVA and χ^2 figures.

Qualitative Subsection A: The Logistical Ordeal and Infrastructure Breakdowns in Isolated Zones

The lengthening of data processing times (38 days highlighted by the ANOVA) finds a vibrant echo in the remarks of field actors. A Regional M&E Responsible expresses his helplessness in the face of technological and geographical isolation:

“Data sometimes sits for three weeks in our drawers. When the city's internet connection cuts out because of cell tower sabotage or rolling blackouts, we can no longer transfer anything to Ouagadougou. If we have to send paper forms by road, the risk of robbery or the condition of the track means drivers refuse to leave without a secured convoy. Meanwhile, the project stagnates and urgent decisions wait”.

— (Verbatim - Regional M&E Officer, North zone)

A Project Director confirms this operational disconnection induced by the inertia of information circuits:

“When information about a borehole breakdown at the communal level finally reaches us a month late, emergency funds are often blocked because the quarter's disbursement window is closed. The statistical system shows us the anomaly way too late to act effectively”.

– (Verbatim - Director of DPP, Oversight Ministry)

Qualitative Subsection B: Pressure from Donors and the Denaturation of M&E

The 82% rate of report orientation toward TFPs is accompanied by a mental and administrative overload felt by the cadres of the Project Management Units (PMUs). A PMU officer testifies to the dictatorship of the imposed logical framework:

“We spend 80% of our working time filling out endless Excel matrices for the World Bank expert. What they want in Washington or Brussels are perfect tables, aligned financial execution rates, and ticked boxes. Whether or not the project creates a real impact on the autonomy of the women in the village is secondary for the report. We produce statistics to satisfy the donor, not to improve our own management”.

– (Verbatim - Technical Officer of the PMU)

This external pressure generates a disconnection from final beneficiaries, who are excluded from the feedback loop, as a communal representative emphasizes:

“Surveyors come, ask us questions for hours, take our numbers, and then leave. We never see the results again. We don't know what they write in their reports in Ouagadougou. Monitoring and evaluation happens over our heads; we are just suppliers of statistics”.

– (Verbatim - Representative of communal beneficiaries)

5. Critical Discussion & Managerial Recommendations

5.1. Critical Discussion of Results

5.1.1. Conceptualization of the “Facade Compliance Syndrome”

The convergence of quantitative results and qualitative thematic analyses highlights a complex managerial phenomenon that we term the "Facade Compliance Syndrome". This concept denotes an organizational defense mechanism by which a public administration or a PMU adopts the formal appearance, rituals, and tools of managerial modernity (RBM, M&E software, resident experts) to legitimize its position vis-à-vis the outside world, while keeping its actual bureaucratic practices unchanged.

This syndrome is the direct product of the structural financial dependence of the Burkinabè State on international aid. Local managers, aware that the renewal of

funding tranches depends exclusively on the validation of progress reports, orient all their energy toward upward accountability (toward donors). They construct a clean, smoothed, and criticism-free “managerial façade”. This administrative survival behavior occurs to the detriment of real managerial adaptation on the ground. Operational errors, major logistical delays, and planning inconsistencies are omitted or masked in global statistical aggregates to avoid upsetting TFPs. M&E thus loses its scientific and reflexive essence to become a bureaucratic staging, a contractual formality cut off from the learning dynamic advocated by Patton (2008).

5.1.2. Anchoring to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The operational inefficiency of M&E highlighted by our results (slow feedback loops, information rupture between center and periphery) produces systemic repercussions that directly hinder Burkina Faso's international commitments. Specifically, this institutional dysfunction paralyzes the attainment of Target 16.6 of SDG 16, which aims to “develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”. When monitoring data takes 38 days to trigger a correction decision in a regional branch, the public institution loses its credibility and effectiveness.

Slow decision-making equates to a public service breakdown for rural populations. By extension, this institutional failure severely harms global poverty reduction projects (SDG 1). In rural Sahelian environments, the vulnerability of populations to shocks (climatic, security-related) requires agile emergency interventions. If the M&E system of a program supporting IGAs or distributing agricultural inputs is incapable of reporting target diversions, logistical breakdowns, or targeting inadequacies in a timely manner, financial resources are wasted. The failure of M&E creates a domino effect: ineffective institutions (SDG 16) inevitably lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, perpetuating the vicious circles of poverty and social exclusion (SDG 1).

5.2. Managerial Recommendations for Restructuring

To restore the capability and strategic utility of the M&E system of these projects or programs, we advocate for the implementation of four urgent reforms:

1. Decentralized Digitalization in Offline Mode: Replace paper forms and Excel files with an architecture based on mobile applications (such as Kobo Collect) operating offline. This would reduce the transmission time of regional data from 22 days to less than 24 hours, nullifying the negative effect of distance identified in the hypothesis.
2. Pruning and Refocusing the Indicator Matrix: Reduce the current number of indicators by 50%. It is necessary to eliminate overly complex composite indicators that are not mastered by agents and to co-construct, according to Patton's principles, a restricted core of “10 Key Performance Indicators” (KPIs) focused on immediate impacts.
3. Creation of Decentralized Decision Cells: Institutionalize quarterly performance reviews at the commune and regional branch levels, endowed

with autonomous budget amendment power. Information must serve local action before being transmitted for control at the central level.

4. Continuous Capacity Upgrading Plan: Finance a certifying training cycle in applied statistics and database management for all program M&E officers, in order to eliminate data entry and information processing error rates.

6. Conclusion & Perspectives

6.1. Synthesis of Contributions

This research has allowed for an empirical and quantitative evaluation of the impact of the monitoring and evaluation system on the performance of development projects or programs in Burkina Faso. The results demonstrate that the performance of a public program does not depend on the thickness of its procedural manual or the theoretical sophistication of its logical framework, but on its capacity to transform collected data into a lever for managerial action and collective learning. By validating the three working hypotheses, the article has exposed the structural blockages (logistics, skills, accountability bias toward donors) that transform a steering tool into a bureaucratic burden.

6.2. Limitations and Research Perspectives

While providing major managerial insights, this study presents limitations that open the way for future research. The quantitative sample, though representative of management cadres, would benefit from being expanded to a larger number of execution agents at the level of decentralized local authorities. Furthermore, our collection did not directly integrate perception data from the final beneficiary populations.

Future research should focus on analyzing the impact of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in predictive maintenance and automated monitoring of public infrastructures in the Sahelian environment. The integration of connected sensors on boreholes or decentralized energy systems could automate technical monitoring, thereby eliminating human collection biases and revolutionizing the territorial governance of developing countries.

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